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Tensions and Synergies in Religious Liberty: 
An Evaluation of the Interrelation of Freedom of 
Belief with Other Human Rights; Parallel Equality 
and Anti-discrimination Provisions; Enforcement in 
Competing European Courts; and Mediated Dispute 
Resolution 
Mark Hill QC* 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite its sixty year history, the European Court of Human 
Rights has only recently begun to develop a cohesive systematic 
jurisprudence on freedom of religion and belief. Hitherto, other 
articles were generally engaged in conjunction with those touching 
religious liberty—for example, freedom of association or freedom of 
expression—and having found a violation in relation to one of these 
articles, the Court has deemed it unnecessary to consider the 
separate and parallel violation of Article 9. Thus, the academic world 
has been denied detailed and systematic judicial pronouncements on 
the reach of freedom of religion and belief and the extent to which it 
may be qualified by other human rights. As yet, therefore there is 
only a nascent body of jurisprudence by which commentators can 
fully assess the extent to which the European Court of Human 
Rights positions the place of religion in a democratic society. 
However, such limited pronouncements as exist promote the 
importance and centrality of freedom of religion and belief as being a 
core component to human existence.  Where the jurisprudence is 
largely silent, however, is in the tension which exists between 
religious liberty and other rights protected by the Convention and 
by other international instruments. 
 
* Centre for Law and Religion, Cardiff University, United Kingdom; Extraordinary Professor, 
Department of Church Polity, University of Pretoria, South Africa. This address was given at 
the Twentieth Annual Law and Religion Symposium at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University in October 2013. 
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There are obvious synergies between associational rights and 
freedom of expression and religious liberty, since faith is lived out in 
community with others and by outward manifestations. But the 
more complex—and more tendentious—clash is with the right of 
family life. The understanding of “family” is now very different from 
when the court was established sixty years ago. As a matter of law 
(the Convention being a “living instrument,” reinventing meanings 
and definitions with societal changes over generations) a same-sex 
relationship is now considered a “family”—even though many 
religious groups find this concept doctrinally unacceptable. 
I. GAY RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN EXAMPLE FROM THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
An example of the conflict between faith and human sexuality 
arose recently in the UK: Lillian Ladele was a devout Christian. She 
was employed by Islington Borough Council as a registrar of 
marriages. She did this job conscientiously for many years. Then the 
law changed in the UK. Civil partnerships were introduced and these 
were to be registered by marriage registrars. For a while Islington 
arranged its rosters so that Lilian only registered marriages. Many 
other councils made similar arrangements.  However, after persistent 
lobbying from gay colleagues, Islington changed its policy and 
required all its registrars to register both marriages and civil 
partnerships. 
Due to her religious beliefs, Lilian in good conscience could not 
register civil partnerships. She resigned from her job and brought a 
claim against Islington for constructive dismissal. She lost. She ought 
to have won because Islington could and should have 
accommodated her beliefs. Sadly, she also lost in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).1 The court applied the “margin 
of appreciation” deferring the value judgment to the legislature and 
judiciary of the member state: a form of moral subsidiarity. 
But in the linked appeal of Eweida (heard at the same time), 
there was no such restraint by the ECtHR: it micro-managed the 
contractual terms of engagement concerning a private company 
(British Airways) and one of its employees (a Coptic Christian).2 In a 
 
 1. Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 & 
36516/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.  37, ¶¶ 23–30 (2013). 
 2. Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R.  37. 
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single judgment, the ECtHR both overreached itself and abrogated 
its duty to secure human rights protection under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Lilian’s religious conscience was sacrificed at the altar of non-
discrimination. The Equality Act, which implemented a European 
Directive, outlaws discrimination on the grounds of what are called 
“protected characteristics”: sex, race, age, disability, sexual 
orientation, etc. Islington council would breach its equality duty if it 
discriminated on the ground of sexual orientation. 
But where was the greater harm? No gay couple was denied civil 
partnership status. Islington could still provide the service in the 
borough. But Lilian was rendered unemployed. In pursuing a non-
discrimination agenda, the Court was complicit in a “race to the 
bottom”: secularism triumphing over pluralism. 
II. EQUALITY: A RISING TIDE FOR ALL RELIGIONS 
As George Orwell famously observed in his novel Animal Farm, 
although all men may be equal, some are more equal than others.3 
The concept of equality, therefore, needs to be clearly identified, 
formulated, and implemented if it is not to become an instrument 
which drives religion out of the public square, providing nothing 
more than an anodyne core stripped of cultural, social, religious, and 
ethical viewpoints which animate human well-being and interaction. 
The nightmare vision of a white light of neutrality, bland and 
blinding in its effect, needs to be replaced with a rainbow spectrum 
of multi-coloured diversity, in which difference is valued and 
respected, refracted through the prism of faith being lived out in 
community. 
In many ways, newly minted equality provisions, both of national 
and international origin, can be used to promote the goal of 
religious liberty in countries where, historically, there is a favored or 
privileged religion: for example, the Church of England in part of 
the United Kingdom or Protestant denominations in northern 
Europe. To the extent that rights or privileges are afforded to one 
church, the prohibition on discrimination under Article 14 of the 
ECHR requires that similar rights and privileges should be afforded 
to ALL churches.4 This promotes a healthy pluralism and acts as a 
 
 3. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet 2004) (1945). 
 4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
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bastion against secularism. To adopt a nautical image, the rising tide 
lifts all boats. 
Properly nurtured, the principle of equality need not result in a 
retreat into secularism, but can actively promote religious liberty, by 
giving to minorities precisely the same rights and advantages as are 
enjoyed by majoritarian or State churches. This key point of 
engagement is precisely the issue which the ECtHR will need to 
address in its determination in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. United Kingdom. The LDS church maintains that it is 
disadvantaged since it is denied a favourable exemption from a tax 
liability which is enjoyed by the Church of England and by other 
mainstream Christian denominations. The judgment of the 
Strasbourg is awaited.5 
III. PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF REDRESS IN EUROPE? 
Europe has the benefit of (or is burdened by—depending on 
one’s viewpoint) two pan-national courts.6 The domestic courts of 
member states benefit from these pan-national institutions for their 
methodology and analysis, for the exposure of conceptual, cultural, 
terminological, and linguistic misunderstandings amongst European 
lawyers, and for the development of substantive jurisprudence.7 The 
respective courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg are distinctly 
different in a number of ways, both procedurally and substantively. 
They have rarely been compared systematically, hence the analysis 
which follows. 
The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.8 The Convention 
charged the Court with the enforcement and implementation of the 
 
14, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 5. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7552/09 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), was decided five months after this address was given in October 2013. 
The Court held that there was no violation. 
 6. I am grateful to Thomas Jones for his assistance in researching this section of the 
paper and to Dr. Russell Sandberg of Cardiff University and Dr. Ronan McCrea of University 
College, London, for commenting on earlier drafts. 
 7. The benefits also extend beyond the territorial borders of Europe. For example, in 
the 2007 Pillay case, Justice Pius Langa for the South African Constitutional Court referred to 
the application of the margin of appreciation to faith-based cases in Strasbourg in his discussion 
of the autonomy of school boards in determining uniform codes impinging on religious rights. 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v. Pillay, 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) ¶ 80 (S. Afr.). 
 8. Not to be confused with the European Union or any of its previous incarnations. 
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ECHR in all forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is not related 
to the ECtHR.9 However, all EU states are members of the Council 
of Europe and signatories to the ECHR. The CJEU refers to the 
case law of the ECtHR and treats the ECHR as though it were part 
of the EU’s legal system. All EU institutions are bound under Article 
6 of the EU Treaty of Nice to respect human rights under the 
ECHR. Under the Treaty of Lisbon (December 1, 2009), the EU 
became a party to the ECHR, and thus CJEU is bound by the case 
law of the ECtHR.10 
The ECtHR’s seminal judgment in the recent case of Eweida 
and Others v. United Kingdom11 provides a helpful snapshot of its 
current approach to religious liberty.12 In these conjoined 
applications (one of which was made by Lilian Ladele, whose 
treatment at the hands of the United Kingdom courts has been 
discussed in an earlier section of this paper) the principles raised had 
been adverted to in a lecture by Sir Nicolas Bratza.13 They are 
helpfully summarized in paragraphs 79 and 80 of the Court’s 
judgment.14 
The Court stated that, as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion is one of the foundations of a 
democratic society.15 In its religious dimension, it is one of the most 
vital elements that makes up the identity of believers and their 
 
 9. For a very full discussion of issues of religion within the institutional framework of 
the EU, see RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (2010). 
 10. For some hints on collaborative practice between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
courts, see Jean Paul Costa, The Relationship Between the European Court of Human Rights 
and National Constitutional Courts, Sir David Williams Lecture, University of Cambridge 
(Feb. 15, 2013). 
 11. Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 & 
36516/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.  37, ¶¶ 23–30 (2013). For a detailed analysis of the decision, see 
Mark Hill, Religious Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of 
Strasbourg’s Judgment in Eweida and others v United Kingdom, 15 ECC. L.J. 191 (2013). 
 12. For a full analysis see Mark Hill, Religion and Anti-Discrimination Norms: 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg Compared in the proceedings of the Third Convention of the 
International Consortium of Law and Religion Scholars (forthcoming 2014). 
 13. Nicolas Bratza, The “Precious Asset”: Freedom of Religion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 9–
26 (Mark Hill ed., 2012), reproduced in 14 ECC. L.J. 256–271 (2012). 
 14. Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R.  37 ¶¶ 79–80. 
 15. Id. 
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conception of life. But it is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics, and the unconcerned. Religious freedom is 
primarily a matter of individual thought and conscience, which is 
absolute and unqualified. Manifestation of belief, alone and in 
private, but also in community with others and in public (in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance)16 may have an impact on others. 
Article 9 section 2 qualifies the right such that any limitation placed 
on a person’s freedom to manifest religion or belief must be 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of 
one or more legitimate aims. 
After setting out these broad, well-established, and non-
controversial statements of principle, the majority opinion then 
identifies three subtle but significant elucidations through which the 
Article 9 right to freedom of religion is reinforced. In re-articulating 
the ambit of Article 9, through this carefully voiced judgment, the 
effective reach of the provision as an instrument for securing 
religious liberty is significantly increased.17 First, the ECtHR has 
made plain that the duty of neutrality of individual governments “is 
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way those beliefs are expressed,” 
provided that the religious view demonstrates a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance.18 Second, the 
judgment outlaws the narrow interpretation of manifestation which 
required a doctrinal mandate. While rightly acknowledging that 
liturgical acts are self-evidently outward expressions of belief, the 
ECtHR made clear that the manifestation of religion is much wider 
than this. The third and most significant aspect of the Court’s 
judgment is the laying to rest of a principle that had been gaining 
currency in both Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence, to the 
 
 16. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, ¶ 
31 (1993); see also Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5, ¶ 105 
(Grand Chamber 2005). 
 17. Significantly, this is the first adverse determination for the United Kingdom on 
Article 9 since it became a signatory to the Convention and runs counter to the trend 
identified in Silvio Ferrari, Law and Religion in a Secular World: A European Perspective, 14 
ECC. L.J. 363 (2012). 
 18. Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R.  37 ¶ 81. This clarification might legitimately be applied, for 
example, in the pending case of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 7552/09, communicated to the Government on 26 April 2011. The challenged 
decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords can be found at Gallagher 
(Valuation Officer) v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints [2008] UKHL 56. 
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effect that if a person can take steps to circumvent a limitation placed 
upon him or her, such as resigning from a particular job, then there 
is no interference with the Article 9 right.19 
The emergence of a distinctive European jurisprudence is 
valuable as a counter balance to denominational majorities and 
religious nationalism.20 From the Kokkinakis case in 199321 to the 
French case Association Les Témoins de Jéhovah in 2011,22 the 
ECtHR has developed a robust protection of the rights and interests 
of religious minorities. Sometimes national courts have paved the 
way, but the contribution of the ECtHR cannot be ignored.  In his 
concurring opinion for the Grand Chamber of the Court of 
Strasbourg in the 2011 appeal judgment on Lautsi, Justice Bonello 
warned: 
A court of human rights cannot allow itself to suffer from historical 
Alzheimer’s. It has no right to disregard the cultural continuum of 
a nation’s flow through time, nor to ignore what, over the 
centuries, has served to mould and define the profile of a people. 
No supranational court has any business substituting its own ethical 
mock-ups for those qualities that history has imprinted on the 
national identity.23 
In many ways, this represents the pursuit of transformative justice 
instead of acquiescence in what might be considered to be the 
untouchable identity of a given country. Similarly, in the Refah 
Partisi decisions, the idea of the State’s role as supreme umpire or 
moderator encapsulates what some consider to be “the European 
project”: 
 
 19. As the Court states in the opinion of the majority: 
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court 
considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion 
in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job would 
negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to weigh that 
possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was 
proportionate. 
Eweida, Eur. Ct. H.R.  37 ¶ 83. 
 20. See Marco Ventura, The Changing Civil Religion of Secular Europe, in 41 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947–61 (2010). 
 21. Kokkinakis, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18. 
 22. Association Les Témoins de Jehovah v. France, App. No. 8916/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2011). 
 23. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber 2011) ¶ 1.1. 
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The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral 
and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths 
and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, 
religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. It also 
considers that the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is 
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs . . . and that it requires the State to 
ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups.24 
The endeavour of the ECtHR was about reconciling principles with 
reality. Justice Tulkens’s powerful dissenting opinion in Leyla Sahin 
affirmed this: 
the Court’s review must be conducted in concreto, in principle by 
reference to three criteria: first, whether the interference, which 
must be capable of protecting the legitimate interest that has been 
put at risk, was appropriate; second, whether the measure that has 
been chosen is the measure that is the least restrictive of the right 
or freedom concerned; and, lastly, whether the measure was 
proportionate, a question which entails a balancing of the 
competing interests.25 
However, because human rights scholars and practitioners tend 
to concentrate upon the ECtHR in Strasbourg, the potential of the 
CJEU in Luxembourg has been largely overlooked. Article 10 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has very similar terms as Article 
9 of the ECHR.26 The CJEU characterizes the ECHR as an 
instrument having “special relevance” for the determination and 
interpretation of EU law,27 and Article 52 section 3 of the EU 
Charter states that Charter rights are to be interpreted consistently 
with corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR. The EU 
Charter, unlike the ECHR, is not a universal document of human 
rights protection; instead its provisions apply to EU institutions and 
member States when they are “implementing EU law.”28 
 
 24. Partisi v Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, & 41343/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(Grand Chamber 2003). 
 25. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5 (Grand Chamber 
2005) (Tulkens, J., dissenting, ¶ 2). 
 26. European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 10, 
2012/C 326/02 (Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter EU Charter]. 
 27. Hoechst AG v. Commission, joined cases 46/87 and 227/88, 1989 E.C.R. 2859. 
 28. EU Charter, supra note 26, art. 51. 
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Council Directive 2004/113 of the European Community, 
concerning equal treatment between men and women in the access 
to and supply of goods and services, contains as Recital 3 of its 
Preamble: “While prohibiting discrimination, it is important to 
respect other fundamental rights and freedoms, including . . . the 
freedom of religion.”29 The EU Guidelines on the Promotion and 
Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief 30 were adopted on June 
24, 2013 by the EU Council of Foreign Affairs. The guidelines seek 
to promote religious liberty in countries beyond EU borders. The 
guidelines detail the EU’s approach to the freedom of religion or 
belief which the EU will promote in its negotiations with other 
countries. 
Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), which was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
allows the EU Council to pass legislation combating discrimination 
on grounds of on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age, or sexual orientation. It requires unanimity in the 
Council. It does not prohibit discrimination in itself but acts as a 
legal mechanism for the adoption of legislation designed to combat 
discrimination, for example Directive 2000/7831 and Directive 
2000/43.32 
Article 21 of the EU Charter states that “[a]ny discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age, or sexual orientation, shall be prohibited.”33 
 
 29. Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J. (L373) preamble (EC), available at 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:373:0037:0043:en:PDF. 
 30. Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Promotion 
and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (June 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.consilium.euro
pa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137585.pdf. 
 31. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L303) (establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation aimed at combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation). 
 32. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L180) (implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons of racial or ethnic origin). 
 33. EU Charter, supra note 26, art. 21. 
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Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation aimed at combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or 
sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation34 was 
adopted on the basis of Article 19 TFEU. It requires all Member 
States to protect against discrimination on grounds of religion and 
belief in employment, occupation, and vocational training, and 
applies to everybody in the private or public sector and public 
bodies. The Directive prohibits direct and indirect discrimination,35 
harassment,36 instructions to discriminate,37 and victimization38 
based on religion or belief. These terms are not defined in Directive 
itself, leaving it to the Member States to do so. 
Member States are required to transpose Directive 2000/78 into 
their domestic legal systems. They are free to extend the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief to situations 
beyond employment, occupation, and vocational training.39 When 
interpreting Directive 2000/78, the European Court of Justice is 
required to have due regard to Strasbourg jurisprudence, the 1961 
European Social Charter, and the 1996 Revised European Social 
Charter. The proposal for Council Directive 2008/426 on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual 
orientation40 was announced by the European Commission on July 
2, 2008. As with Directive 2000/78, the proposal for Council 
Directive 2008/426 applies to everybody in the private or public 
sector and to public bodies. However, the scope of the proposal is 
much broader, covering social protection (including social security 
and health care), social advantages, education, as well as access to 
and supply of goods and services, such as housing and transport.  
The principle of equal treatment, as provided for in the proposal for 
 
 34. Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L303), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML. 
 35. Id. art. 2(2). 
 36. Id. art. 2(3). 
 37. Id. art. 2(4). 
 38. Id. art. 11. 
 39. For example, the UK Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief in relation to housing and education. 
 40. Proposed Council Directive 2008/426 (July 2, 2008), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0426:FIN:EN:HTML. 
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Council Directive 2008/426, does not apply to differences in 
treatment based on religion or beliefs vis-à-vis access to educational 
institutions founded on a particular religion or belief. As with 
Directive 2000/78, Member States may introduce or maintain more 
protective provisions than the minimum requirements provided for 
in the proposed Directive. 
Corrigendum to Directive 2004/5841 was adopted by virtue of 
Articles 18, 21, 46, 50 and 59 TFEU with regards to the right of 
citizens of the EU and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States.42 The corrigendum 
sought to remedy the piecemeal approach to the right of free 
movement and residence by providing a single, all-encompassing 
legislative provision. Recital 31 of the Preamble to the Corrigendum 
states that: “Member States should implement this Directive without 
discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds 
such as . . . religion or beliefs . . . .”43 
The document Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Non-Discrimination 
and Equal Opportunities For All: A Framework Strategy44 sets out the 
Commission’s strategy for the positive and active promotion of non-
discrimination and equal opportunities for all. The Commission’s 
strategy includes ensuring effective legal protection against 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief across the EU 
through the full transposition by all Member States of the 
Community legislation in this field, notably Directives 2000/78 and 
Directive 2000/43, discussed above. Decision No. 771/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, establishing the European 
Year of Equal Opportunities for All: Towards a Just Society,45 sought 
to raise public awareness of the substantial community acquis in the 
field of equality and non-discrimination. 
 
 41. Corrigendum to Council Directive 2004/58/EC, 2004 O.J. (L158) available at 
http://eur-l
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0038R(01):en:HTML. 
 42. Formerly Articles 12, 18, 40, 44 and 52 TEC. 
 43. Corrigendum to Council Directive 2004/58/EC, supra note 41. 
 44. COM(2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0224&from=EN. 
 45. European Parliament Decision no. 771/2006, O.J. (L146), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006D0771:EN:HTML. 
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An early sign of the general approach may be gauged from the 
decision of the CJEU in the Steymann case.46 The Court had been 
asked to decide on whether a member of a religious community was 
entitled to a pension for his work. The judges had to assess whether 
the question pertained to a purely religious matter or had an 
economic dimension, thus falling within the competence of the 
Court. The judges stated that Article 2 of the EEC Treaty must be 
interpreted such that activities performed by members of a 
community based on religion or philosophy as part of the 
commercial activities of that community constitute economic 
activities insofar as the services which the community provides to its 
members may be regarded as the indirect quid pro quo for genuine 
and effective work. 
There are a number of significant differences which, from a 
litigant’s point of view, might tend to favor the CJEU over the 
ECtHR:47 
i. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 
The ECHR and the procedural rules of the ECtHR require that 
any potential applicants exhaust their domestic remedies before 
they claim relief in the supra-national court. This means that many 
years can be taken up in domestic first instance and appellate courts 
before an application is filed in the ECtHR.48 Referrals to the 
CJEU can be made at any time and declarations are generally given 
more speedily in respect of interpretative decisions on EU 
Directives; 
ii. Delay 
The backlog of cases in the ECtHR means that many years will 
elapse between the incident complained about and the 
determination of the ECtHR.49 The caseload at the CJEU is 
growing but it is does not have such a long backlog of cases. 
 
 46. Case 196/87, Udo Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1988 E.C.R. 6159. 
 47. It may be that trial advocates prefer Strasbourg to Luxembourg as the restaurants 
may be considered superior. 
 48. In the case of Nadia Eweida, she was refused permission openly to wear the cross in 
2006 but did not obtain declaratory relief from the ECtHR until 2013. It is of note that 
British Airways relaxed its dress code within weeks of Ms. Eweida’s complaint so the issue had 
become of wholly academic interest many years prior to the case even reaching Strasbourg. 
 49. At the end of 2011, the backlog of cases exceeded 152,000. See Ken Clarke hails 
deal to overhaul European Court of Human Rights, BBC NEWS (April 19, 2012 12:16 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17762341. 
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iii. Margin of appreciation 
The ECtHR consistently defers to national legislators in relation to 
political, social, cultural, and other considerations. While the CJEU 
openly acknowledges and applies the principle of subsidiarity in 
many instances, no such elasticity is afforded in the enforcement of 
EU Directives which are of direct application member states. The 
CJEU’s interpretative jurisdiction is universally binding and takes 
effect without any reference to a broad margin of appreciation. This 
key matter is addressed more fully below in relation to principles of 
equality. 
iv. Political considerations 
Some critics have commented on a lack of clarity and inconsistency 
of decision making within the ECtHR. Others have pointed to the 
ideological and political underpinning of its case law. It straddles 
jurisprudence and politics, and as one commentator has indicated, 
it occasionally overreaches itself.50 The CJEU, though not immune 
to political pressures, is not required to make the same type of 
sensitive value judgments. 
v. Parties 
In the ECtHR, proceedings can only be brought against Member 
States and the Government of that Member State is the 
Respondent. However, with the leave of the United Kingdom 
domestic courts, referrals are made to the CJEU by the actual 
litigants in the disputes giving an immediacy and a pragmatism to 
their decisions, which are often less theoretical and more rooted in 
reality. 
Returning to the uncertain dynamic between religious liberty 
and equality provisions, the obvious question which arises is what 
will be the level of discretion which the CJEU will leave to national 
authorities in implementing and applying the non-discrimination 
provisions of the equality directives in this sensitive area? A strict 
interpretation could entail far-reaching obligations to accommodate 
religion in the workplace that may not be acceptable to all Member 
States. For instance, the Dutch interpretation of non-discrimination 
law, which does not permit refusal to allow a Muslim school teacher 
to wear a headscarf, would appear unacceptable to France. Although 
EU directives may leave the forms and methods chosen to the 
 
 50. See the comments of Lord Hoffmann and David Cameron. 
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discretion of Member States, the stated objective is binding. This 
suggests a uniform outcome of discrimination claims across Europe, 
at least as far as minimum standards are concerned. In the area of sex 
discrimination this seems to be the case. The CJEU’s case law has 
provided detailed rules which govern the interpretation and 
transposition of the directives in all Member States. They ensure that 
the levels of protection against discrimination to be derived from EU 
law are identical between countries.51 
In comparison, the ECtHR leaves the signatory states a wide 
margin of appreciation to regulate relationships between state and 
religion, and it has been particularly deferential in its case law 
concerning headscarf bans in public education. In the landmark case 
Sahin v Turkey,52 it held a headscarf ban at universities to be 
compatible with the rights enshrined in the ECHR, “where 
questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are 
concerned, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably 
differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be 
given special importance.”53 
The ECtHR accorded particular importance to the lack of 
common ground amongst the states party to the Convention on this 
matter, and consequently the Turkish government was given a 
significant margin of appreciation to decide whether it was necessary 
in the Turkish context to maintain the ban. The ECtHR accepted 
those arguments that referred to the specific Turkish history of 
secularism and the strong political significance of wearing a headscarf 
in Turkey allied to the growing influence of extremist political 
movements. As a result, Turkey was allowed to prohibit not just 
teachers but also adult students from wearing religious symbols in 
educational institutions. Even in France, well known for its strict 
laïcité, the legal ban introduced in 2004 extends only to primary and 
secondary education, not to universities. 
A similarly deferential approach might be politically attractive for 
the CJEU. As has been pointed out by Bell, the EU often tries to 
avoid getting involved in moral controversies. He refers to the 
transnational (non)recognition of same-sex partnerships as an 
 
 51. For an overview of sex discrimination case law see e.g. E. Ellis, EU-
antidiscrimination Law (Oxford University Press 2005). 
 52. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 5 (Grand Chamber 
2005). 
 53. Id. ¶ 109. 
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example. In this context the CJEU has taken pains not to adopt any 
particular task. As Bell remarks: “This is perhaps best described as a 
form of ‘moral subsidiarity,’ which regards issues of cultural or moral 
sensitivity as best left to national discretion.”54 
Though politically understandable, such an approach might leave 
vulnerable minority groups with less human rights protection than 
majority groups. The German experience may provide an example 
how this may resolve itself. The Bundesverfassungsgericht was 
confronted with the question of whether it was constitutional for a 
public school to prohibit a Muslim teacher from wearing a headscarf 
in the class room. The Court held that this issue should be decided 
through the democratic process and that any restriction would have 
to be based on a formal act of the legislatures of the German Länder. 
Subsequently several states adopted such legislation restricting the 
right to manifest religion through certain forms of dress. Several 
introduced legislation effectively banning Muslim religious attire 
whilst leaving Christian symbols untouched. The difference in 
treatment was sometimes justified by the argument that Christian 
symbols are to be perceived as religiously neutral as they have 
become part of the Western cultural tradition. As such, the 
legislation was presented not as privileging one religion over another, 
but as just protecting a neutral educational setting. To date, such 
regulations have not been struck down by German courts as 
incompatible with equality and non-discrimination.55 
A deferential approach by the CJEU potentially leads to widely 
diverging outcomes of transposing the equality directives: they may 
come to mean entirely different things in different countries. This is 
all the more problematic as some of the issues engage potential sex 
discrimination, an area where the CJEU traditionally has been strict 
in not allowing widely diverging practices between states. 
We will have to wait and see how the CJEU deals with this 
situation. Will it impose a universal standard on all Member States in 
these controversial areas or instead leave them a wide discretion? 
Although Member States may choose the means to implement the 
 
 54. MARK BELL, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 120 
(2002). 
 55. For an overview of the German developments see Ute Sacksofsky, Religion and 
Equality in Germany: The Headscarf Debate from a Constitutional Perspective, in EUROPEAN 
UNION NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 
EQUALITY LAW 353–70 (Dagmar Schiek & Victoria Chege eds., 2009). 
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non-discrimination standards laid down in the equality directives, 
they are bound to achieve an equal outcome, namely to guarantee an 
equal level of protection against discrimination on grounds of 
religion, sex and race. Yet, it is hard to conceive of a substantively 
uniform level of protection that would be politically acceptable in all 
EU countries. Approaches in the UK and France, to name but two, 
are worlds apart. 
IV. NON-JUSTICIABILITY AND MEDIATION: TWIN PILLARS FOR 
SAFEGUARDING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
This paper has concentrated upon the institutional safeguarding 
of religious liberty in domestic and international courts. This is 
unsurprising having regard to the author’s position as both a scholar 
of religious liberty and a trial lawyer. The decisions of judges in 
disputed cases provide a practical framework for working out the 
competing rights of faith groups and the state. But care must be 
taken in using this growing jurisprudence as a socio-cultural means 
of evaluating the extent of the problem and the means of resolution. 
Litigation is thankfully rare and the headline cases can often give 
misleading indications. The decisions concerning Lilian Ladele and 
Nadia Eweida, which have given context to much of the discussion 
in this paper, might suggest a highly litigious workforce and an 
immovable and bigoted body of private and public sector employers. 
The truth, I venture, is rather different. Every day, up and down the 
country, small differences are being accommodated in the workplace 
with good grace and practical good sense. Give and take is the order 
of the day, and little compromises at a grass roots level ensure a 
harmonious workforce where religious sensibilities are taken into 
account by simple, practical measures. 
There are two separate but complementary reasons why disputes 
of this nature should be kept out of the courts. First, we have 
unrealistic expectations of our judiciary. Judges hate religious 
disputes and are ill-equipped to deal with them. They lack the 
appropriate knowledge, as there is a profound religious illiteracy 
within the government, the executive, and the judiciary. A small 
improvement is that the recent Equality Act has introduced a new 
provision allowing a judge to appoint an expert to advise him or her 
with respect to the protected characteristic (e.g. race, disability, or 
religion). However, in relation to matters of doctrine, this is an area 
into which courts should not trespass. The precise extent of the 
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principle of judicial restraint which stems from the non-justiciability 
of religious disputes will be considered by the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court in February 2014 when it hears the appeal in Khaira 
v. Shergill,56 concerning doctrinal issues in a dispute involving Sikh 
gurdwara in England and the claims of religious leaders based in 
India. 
Second, parallel with judicial self-restraint comes the principle of 
mediation and alternative dispute resolution. The major Abrahamic 
faiths each espouse the doctrine of being reconciled with one’s 
neighbor and avoiding litigation. This scriptural enjoinder seems at 
times to be singularly lacking in a society which is becoming 
increasing litigious, with civic rights trumping social duty. Article 6 
of the ECHR gives a right to a fair trial, but ought there be a 
corresponding obligation to refrain from engaging in unedifying 
litigation? Far better than taking matters to court, a culture of civility 
should encourage individuals to resolve matters in the workplace, the 
school, the university, and so on.57 Sensible people can generally 
come to workable compromises. 
For centuries religions have led the world in humanitarian work, 
education, healthcare, and the relief of poverty. Perhaps now is the 
time for people of faith and communities of faith to be judged by 
their deeds not their words and to show their value to society 
through promotion of mediation and reconciliation: “By their fruits 
shall you know them.” 
  
 
 56. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 983. 
 57. The author is a founder and now co-chair of BIMA (Belief in Mediation and 
Arbitration), a charity established in the United Kingdom to encourage alternative dispute 
resolution of matters with a religious dimension. All major faith groups are represented in 
BIMA, which runs educational activities in addition to providing co-mediators for the 
resolution of disputes. 
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